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THE NEW AMERICAN CODE OF LEGAL
ETHICS.
It was natural that the general trend of public opinion in this
country in favor of codification, as against unwritten law, should of
late years turn the attention of the bar to the question whether
the rules of legal ethics ought not to be put in an authoritative
form. In a number of the States steps have been taken in this
direction, and the last Summer has given us a code stamped with
the approval of the American Bar Association. It is the work of
a strong committee, which has proceeded slowly and carefully. The
task assigned to them was no easy one. It was that of definition
and selection. Omnvis de/jnitio periculosa est; and to select means
to exclude-always a difficult thing to do to general satisfaction,
where questions of morals are concerned.
One is struck, in reading the brief code which has been thus
elaborated, by the extent to which the policy of exclusion has been
carried. Nothing is to be found as to the duties of the Judge; and
little as to many minor matters pertaining to a lawyer's conduct.
In both these respects the action of the Association seems wise.
It is an association of members of the bar, as its name denotes.
A Judge does not, in becoming such, cease to be a lawyer; and
therefore many of them belong to it, and take an active-part in
its proceedings. Justice Brewer was upon the committee which
framed this code. But it is rather for courts to lay down rules
for the bar, than for the bar to prescribe them for the courts. If
Judges need to be reminded of their duties, some of their number
should assume the task, and it should be wholly dissociated from
any rules as to the conduct of those who may practice before them.
The codes of ethics thus far adopted by the State Bar Asso-
ciations are considerably longer than that now approved by the
American Bar Association. They contain more rules, and more
words in stating a rule.
They frequently seek to fortify a canon of conduct by sub-
joining an argument for following it. The reasons given are gen-
erally those of policy. Follow it, they argue, because you will
succeed better in your profession, if you do. Avoid concealing
your strong points until the closing argument, because the court
and jury will think you must have a weak cause, if you resort to
such a course. Do not assert your belief in the justice of your
client's cause, because if you do for one, you must do it for all;
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else the jury will think that, whenever you omit such a statement,
you know that your claims are unfounded. Be prompt and punc-
tual, and it will strengthen your hold on your clients.
The new code of the American Bar Association makes no such
appeals to motives of expediency and self-advantage. It occupies
a higher plane. Its canons are left to rest on principles of right
and honor. The only exception, if it can be deemed such, is the
declaration in the preamble that the future of our country depends
upon the maintenance of Justice pure and unsullied, and that this
can only be secured if the conduct and motives of the American
lawyer merit the approval of all just men. But here the good of
the republic is looked at, not that of the individual.
One canon of great importance has been adopted which is to
be found in the code of no State Bar Association except that of
Kentucky, and is there stated with much less force and precision.
This expresses the duty of the bar with respect to the choice of
Judges. It is asserted to be an active duty; and in that connection
one rule of conduct is mentioned which all accepting judicial office
should be expected to follow. It is to forego all other employ-
ments whatsoever which might embarrass their free and fair con-
sideration of questions brought before them for decision.
To mention but one reason for insisting on this obligation, it
is one of the petty scandals of our American judicial system that
a Judge of a minor court, provided with several Judges, sometimes
appears as counsel one day and as Judge the next. Obviously,
one who has argued before such a tribunal in favor of a debatable
legal proposition ought not, at the same term, to charge a jury in
respect to it. Nor could his refusal to preside over the trial of a
cause in which that question might arise relieve the difficulty of the
situation. It simply substitutes one wrong for another. The pub-
lic have the right to demand that he shall not disqualify himself
from doing what he was appointed to do, and inconvenience others
to profit himself.
It is to take a long step forward for the representatives of the
American bar to declare that it must steadfastly endeavor "to
prevent political considerations from outweighing judicial fitness
in the selection of Judges" and "should protest earnestly and active-
ly against the appointment or election of those who are unsuitable
for the Bench." In the political discussions of the last few years,
the American judiciary has been a frequent subject of attack. There
is no doubt that among its members are some who are incompetent
to undertake its responsibilities, and who, when appointed or elected,
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were known to be thus incompetent by the members of the bar to
which they belonged. The appointing power or the electorate, if
the choice be by popular vote, will seldom, if ever, select a man
whom his professional associates come forward to declare to be un-
fit to exercise the duties of such an office. In asserting it to be their
duty to make such declarations, in the proper quarter, be it in the
office of the Governor, or in a nominating convention, or in a pre-
liminary meeting of the party leaders, or by addressing the public
at large, this new canon ought to have a large and lasting effect.
In no country is the Judge so fully a part of the political administra-
tion of civil government as in the United States, because nowhere
else has he such a power of declaring statutes to be void. In no
country, therefore, can the bar, by preventing improper selections
for judicial office, do so much to promote the proper transaction
of public business, as well as the proper protection of private in-
terests.
The code occasionally contains general expressions which in
practice must be taken with certain implications or limitations.
Thus" it is stated that money of the client coming into the
possession of the lawyer should not be commingled with his'private
property or be used by him. This can hardly be meant to treat it
as a breach of ethical obligation for an attorney of ample means,
who receives a bank check in payment of a claim left with him for
collection, to deposit it to his own credit in his own bank account,
in order conveniently to deduct his own fees, remitting the balance
promptly by his own check to the client. It would seem inz foro con-
scienftie (whatever might be the lawyer's liability, should the bank
fail) that the client's consent to such a transaction would be fairly
implied, even if there had been no previous dealings between them
of a like nature. So the young lawyer who receives a five dollar
bank note to apply on a claim for a hundred dollars can hardly
be regarded as in the wrong, if he puts it for safe keeping in his
own pocket-book, provided it be with the intention of paying over
the sum due at the first reasonable opportunity, although it might
not, and naturally would not, be so paid by the delivery of that
particular bill.
Other articles must be read with some care, as a whole, in order
to get at their true meaning.
Thus Article 27 declares that the "publication or circulation of
ordinary simple business cards" is not per se improper, but that
'Article II.
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"solicitation of business by circulars or advertisments" is unpro-
fessional. Here "publication" would seem to include and certainly
should include a publication in a newspaper of such a card as a
paid advertisement. The distinction which it was intended to
draw would appear to be that between advertising the fact that
one is a lawyer and does business at a certain place or at certain
hours, and an advertisement in which, besides this, business, or
business of a certain kind, is solicited.
So Article 28, after declaring it to be disreputable for a lawyer
to hunt up causes of action in favor of those who are ignorant of
them, in order to obtain employment to bring suits; to be an
ambulance-chaser; "or to pay or reward, directly or indirectly,
those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office,
or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians,
hospital attathds or others who may succeed, under the guise of
giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal,
the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his pro-
fessional services," proceeds to state that it is the duty of any mem-
ber of the bar "having knowledge of such practices upon the part
of any .practitioner, immediately to inform thereof to the end that
the offender may be disbarred." Here the words "such practices"
are apparently to be limited in their application to the last of the
class of acts which have been censured; for disbarment would,
except under extraordinary circumstances, seem to be too heavy
a penalty for the others.
The canon regarding contingent fees was the only one amended
in substance, by the Association, in dealing with the report of the
Committee, and indeed it is not clear that this amendment changed
anything but the form, so as to make plainer what was the inten-
tion of those who drafted it. In its present shape it seems to
sanction, by implication, arrangements for contingent fees (when
not contrary to the local law), provided their terms are reasonable;
and its real emphasis is laid on the necessity of providing a prompt
remedy for the client by the supervisory action of the court, if
any unfair advantage of his necessities has been taken. Precisely
how this supervisory action should be invoked was left to be decided
by the local practice; and it would have been difficult to frame any
form of procedure of universal application.
One question of professional obligation, as to which the prac-
tice at the English bar might be misleading, has been definitely
and properly settled 2 : An American lawyer is free to decline
'By Article 31.
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any retainer. There may be a reason for denying such a
right to the English barrister. His retainer comes through the
hands and at the instanc of another legal practitioner, who pre-
sumably has satisfied himself that the action ought in justice to be
brought or defended, as the case may be. To refuse to accept it
would reflect on him. With us, where the client comes or can
with propriety come directly to him whom he wishes to advocate
his cause, such considerations of fraternity or professional etiquette
have no place.
The committee had before it an important suggestion from
Justice Brewer that a short body of rules should be prepared to
be "given operative and binding force by legislation, or the action
of the highest courts of the States," where that should be within
their powers. It concluded not to urge such an endorsement of the
code, as a whole, but, instead, drafted a form of oath to be taken
on admission to the bar, which the Association by its action has
now recommended "for adoption by the proper authorities in all
the States and Territories." This form is mainly taken from that
prescribed in the State of Washington, which was itself founded
to a considerable extent on that in use in the Swiss Canton of
Geneva. Both these, however, were subject to serious, criticism
in that they contained a pledge to counsel or maintain such pro-
ceedings only as should appear to the affiant to be just, except in
the defence of one charged with crime. This forces the lawyer
into the position of a Judge, before the case has been brought or
heard. He must be satisfied that a suit or defence is just, before
he can take the first step in court. The form recommended by the
Association gives the provision in this respect a different turn.
The affiant pledges himself not to counsel or maintain any suit
or proceeding which shall appear to him to be unjust, nor any de-
fence except such as he believes to be honestly debatable under
the law of the land. The burden assumed as to actions is not to
satisfy oneself that a suit is just, before bringing it, but not to
bring it if satisfied that it is unjust-an obligation much less oner-
ous; while as to defences it is enough if they seem to him honestly
to present a question which, under the law, may be fairly made a
subject of discussion on the trial. In both cases, the client has the
benefit of the doubt.
This seems right. A lawyer should decline a retainer to ac-
complish what appears to him, after due consideration, to be a
piece of injustice, but, if it does not so appear, that is, if after due
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consideration he is not of the opinion that the cause or defence
which he is asked to advocate is unjust, the question becomes one
which ought to be decided by a court, after hearing both sides, if
the party interested desires a judicial determination. The oath
used in some of the Germanic States is framed upon similar lines.
In another point the Washington form has been changed to
advantage. Following the ancient Geneva pattern, it pledged the
affiant never to seek to mislead or deceive the Judge by any artifice
or falsehood. This may have been sufficient in a country having
no system of trials by a jury, but the committee, in view of the
prevalence of that system here, properly added the words "or jury"
after "Judge."
One addition to the form is of more doubtful merit, because it
refers to a practice which can never be of common occurrence,
while it would seem that a lawyer's oath of office should be confined
to obligations of fundamental importance and general concern.
This is a pledge that the affiant will accept no compensation in
connection with a client's business, except from him or with his
knowledge and approval.
Another addition taken from the ancient New England form,
dating back to early colonial days, is a pledge not to delay any
man's cause for lucre and malice. This, again, must be construed
in view of what precedes it. If a client desires delay for a legiti-
mate reason, to accept remuneration from him for securing it by
taking advantage of some legal right can hardly be deemed rep-
rehensible. To delay his client's cause, on the other hand, in order
to increase his own fees, would be obviously wrong.
It might be too high praise to say that this code, as finally
approved, could not have been made better. But the question for
the American lawyer is not whether a more perfect one could be
made. It is whether this code, having been framed after long de-
liberation and extensive correspondence by a capable committee
representing all parts of the United States, and adopted with
practical unanimity, after full opportunity for discussion, by the
American Bar Association, ought not, as a whole, to receive his
support.
If this code is accepted by the Bar Associations of every State,
as a fair general statement of the main duties of members of the
legal profession, a great purpose will be well accomplished. An
authoritative criterion will be supplied, by which every lawyer can
be safely guided, when he is in doubt as to the conduct he should
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pursue in respect to any of the questions which oftenest prove a
source of perplexity. The law student will have a mentor, always
at hand. The courts will hesitate less in enforcing the discipline
of the bar, since professional misconduct will be, more than ever
before, a sinning against the light.
SIMON E. BALDWIN.
Nmw HAVi, CoNN.
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